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Abstract. Social identities are among the key factors driving behavior in complex
societies. Signals of social identity are known to influence individual behaviors in the
adoption of innovations. Yet the population-level consequences of identity signaling
on the diffusion of innovations are largely unknown. Here we use both analytical and
agent-based modeling to consider the spread of a beneficial innovation in a struc-
tured population in which there exist two groups who are averse to being mistaken
for each other. We investigate the dynamics of adoption and consider the role of
structural factors such as demographic skew and communication scale on population-
level outcomes. We find that outgroup aversion can lead to adoption being delayed or
suppressed in one group, and that population-wide underadoption is common. Com-
paring the two models, we find that differential adoption can arise due to structural
constraints on information flow even in the absence of intrinsic between-group differ-
ences in adoption rates. Further, we find that patterns of polarization in adoption
at both local and global scales depend on the details of demographic organization
and the scale of communication. This research has particular relevance to widely
beneficial but identity-relevant products and behaviors, such as green technologies,
where overall levels of adoption determine the positive benefits that accrue to society
at large.
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1. Introduction
The adoption of new technologies, products, and behaviors can be influenced by
identity signaling. Consider, as an example, the adoption of hybrid cars. Owners of a
Toyota Prius are willing to pay a few thousand dollars to signal their green intentions
(Sexton & Sexton, 2014). On the other hand anti-environmentalists spend thousands
of dollars to modify their vehicle’s emissions systems to deliberately spew sooty diesel
exhaust on electric cars, bicyclists and pedestrians (Weigel, 2014). In 2014, Cadil-
lac and Ford capitalized on differences among proponents of hybrid cars, producing
advertisements for their plug-in hybrids that appealed to contrasting values among
car owners for products with similar functional qualities (Bradford, 2014). Recent
experimental work has additionally highlighted that both adoption and disadoption
of products and other consumptive behaviors are influenced by the perceived social
identities of previous adopters (Berger & Heath, 2007, 2008; Brooks & Wilson, 2015;
Morvinski, Amir, & Muller, 2014). It is therefore clear that social identity should not
be ignored when considering how products diffuse in a population. Nevertheless, the
role of identity has been largely absent in models of product diffusion (Peres, Muller,
& Mahajan, 2010).
In this paper, we present formal models of product adoption under the influence
of identity signaling and explore the population-level consequences of identity on dif-
fusion dynamics1. We examine product adoption as a form of social marking, and
how the emergence of a product’s role in identity signaling influences the diffusion of
innovations. In particular, we investigate the effect of outgroup aversion on adoption,
taking into account the spatial structure of a population and varying scales of commu-
nication across distances. In the interest of clarity, we first discuss a simple analytical
model that relies on coupled differential equations. This model was first introduced by
Bakshi et al. (2013); we adapt it for our purposes. We then introduce an agent-based
model with explicit spatial structure. A model capable of capturing who interacts
with whom, as agent-based models do, is critical for understanding social behavior
because the structure of interactions shapes the temporal and categorical dynamics
of social behavior (Boccaletti, Latora, Moreno, Chavez, & Hwang, 2006; Durrett
& Levin, 1994; Newman, 2003), including how innovations spread (Abrahamson
& Rosenkopf, 1997; Burt, 1980; Davis & Greve, 1997; Delre, Jager, Bijmolt, &
Janssen, 2010; Watts & Dodds, 2007). We demonstrate that 1) differential rates of
adoption typically attributed to intrinsic between-group differences in rates of adop-
tion can arise simply due to structural constraints on information flow, and 2) that
equilibrium levels of adoption, as well as global and local polarization in adoption,
depend heavily on both demographic organization and the scale of communication.
1.1. Identity Signaling and Product Adoption. Identity signaling is the broad-
casting of one’s membership in some group or collective, with receivers including
both fellow members and non-members. Identity signaling is important when multi-
ple groups exist in a population and individuals benefit by being correctly identified
with their group, as well as by not being mistaken for a member of another group.
1We use the terms “product” and “innovation” interchangeably, as our models apply equally
to innovations, non-innovative products, and any other behavior that can be adopted via social
influence.
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The anthropological literature has long characterized arbitrary social markers as crit-
ical for coordination when correlations exist between group identity and behavioral
norms (Barth, 1969; McElreath, Boyd, & Richerson, 2003; Moffett, 2013; Wim-
mer, 2013). In complex societies such as ours, interactions delineated by social
identities are ubiquitous (Smaldino, 2017), and social markers are crucial coordina-
tion tools. Although social identities are multidimensional and context dependent
(Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004; Roccas & Brewer, 2002), in any
particular context humans appear to have strong instincts to identify with a group,
even if the distinguishing factor between ingroup and outgroup is arbitrary (Tajfel,
Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971).
Although individuals often adopt a product for its intrinsic value, product adoption
can also be used to distinguish oneself from other groups (Berger & Heath, 2008).
When adoption can be observed by others, products may become social markers and
serve the role of helping individuals to find appropriate social partners for interactions
(McElreath et al., 2003; Smaldino, 2017). For this reason, an individual may be less
likely to adopt an innovation if it is more strongly associated with an outgroup than
with their ingroup or with no group at all. Indeed, recent marketing studies suggest
that the identity signaling component of product adoption comes into play even when
the outgroup does not evoke negative affect, as long as it is seen as dissimilar. For
example, in one study, Stanford undergraduates evaluated an mp3 player substantially
less favorably after being told that it was popular with “business executives” (whom
they rated as dissimilar but not disliked) compared with when they were told it was
popular with “individuals” (Berger & Heath 2007, study 4). Conversely, Morvinski et
al. (2014) found that information about a large number of previous adopters positively
influenced adoption only if those previous adopters were described as similar to the
potential adopters. In another study, after adopting a charity-affiliated bracelet,
students from a “jock” dorm dis-adopted (i.e., stopped wearing the bracelet) when the
bracelet started appearing on the wrists of students from the nearby “nerdy” dorm,
whom the jocks did not dislike but also did not want to be mistaken for (Berger &
Heath 2008, study 2). This latter study also serves to illustrate that products need
not be intrinsically associated with particular social groups, but can emerge as social
markers through preferential adoption by one group, for reasons that may be initially
arbitrary.
1.2. Population Structure and Population Dynamics. The sociological litera-
ture has shown that even small differences in opinions, preferences, or product adop-
tion can cascade, through the processes of homophily and social influence, into highly
polarized social networks (Axelrod, 1997; Carley, 1991; Flache & Macy, 2011;
Mark, 1998). A great deal of research has shown that the structure of those networks
affects exactly how individuals influence, and are influenced by, one another (Abra-
hamson & Rosenkopf, 1997; Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duflo, & Jackson, 2013;
Burt, 1980; Delre et al., 2010; Flache & Macy, 2011; Funk, Gilad, Watkins, &
Jansen, 2009; Strogatz, 2001; Watts & Dodds, 2007). As a striking example,
conformity across a broad spectrum of lifestyle preferences is seen within clusters of
Americans identified only by political affiliation, such that arbitrary traits become
markers of identity, as with “latte-drinking liberals” and “gun-toting republicans”
(DellaPosta, Shi, & Macy, 2015). Although many factors lead to the adoption
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of behaviors or technologies, social influence through no other factor than network
proximity can be such a powerful force that some have argued it must be explicitly
discounted before other cultural or developmental explanations may be considered
(DellaPosta et al., 2015; Dow, Burton, & White, 1982; McPherson, 2004).
As a description of the emergence of an initially neutral product becoming strongly
associated with a particular social identity, consider another example, this time from
the beer industry. In the 1980s, Pabst Blue Ribbon (PBR) was a relatively unpopular
beer in the United States, loosely associated with the white working class. Then, in
the late 1990s, bars in Brooklyn and Lower Manhattan began offering PBR drink
specials, attracted by its low price and relative obscurity. The brand gradually be-
came associated with urban hipsters, spread to hipster enclaves in Portland and Los
Angeles, and has since found widespread adoption in hip youth culture. Without any
direct advertising, adoption as a social marker cascaded. Sold in 1985 for $63 million
($141 million in 2015 dollars), PBR was recently sold again in 2014 for an estimated
$700 million (Gelles, 2014). Meanwhile, its identity as a “hipster beer” may have
turned at least some people away. As of this writing, the top definition for PBR on
urbandictionary.com includes the remark, “Pabst Blue Ribbon is a lot like the band
Bright Eyes. Hipsters love it, but everyone else thinks it’s liquid shit.”
A standard model of product adoption invokes status: a social marker describes a
demarcation between social elites, who innovate in order to distinguish themselves,
and the lower classes, who imitate the elites. This process of chase and flight drives
new cycles of fashions as the elites continuously attempt to distance themselves from
the lower classes (Simmel, 1957). However, many cases of adoption or abandonment
of products are not so easily characterized in terms of status. Indeed, innovations
and fashions often originate from among the lower or middle classes (Berger & Heath,
2008). Chase and flight dynamics are undoubtedly important in many settings, in-
cluding some that don’t involve groups with differing levels of socio-economic status
(Bakshi, Hosanagar, & Van den Bulte, 2013). However, products are commonly
used as social markers facilitating preferential interaction with ingroup members on
the part of all groups. Indeed, a large anthropological literature has demonstrated
that, regardless of status, individuals are often better off when they can easily dis-
tinguish group members from non-members (Barth, 1969; McElreath et al., 2003;
Moffett, 2013; Wimmer, 2013). It is therefore important to examine diffusion dy-
namics for scenarios involving general tendencies for outgroup aversion, as suggested
in an influential review by Peres et al. (2010). Such an analysis has hitherto been
missing from the literature on product adoption.
There are many important factors to consider in the dynamics of innovation adop-
tion, and our aim here is not to cover all of them with the veneer of identity signaling.
In particular, we will not address multi-brand competition, in which companies selling
similar products compete for customers. This type of competition has only recently
been the subject of formal modeling, always with the assumption that customers are
identical and brands equivalent (Laciana, Gual, Kalmus, Oteiza-Aguirre, & Rovere,
2014; Laciana & Oteiza-Aguirre, 2014; Libai, Muller, & Peres, 2009). Such com-
petition entails rich dynamics, influenced by a host of factors such as the timing of
product release, the network position of early adopters, and the strength of cross-
brand influence (Libai et al., 2009; Libai, Muller, & Peres, 2013). Because the
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interplay between adoption and identity signaling has not been previously modeled,
we believe it appropriate to limit our study here to the one-product, one-brand case so
as to establish a baseline. Later in this paper, we will discuss multi-brand competition
in light of our results.
1.3. Modeling Approach. We wish to consider how patterns of adoption are influ-
enced by outgroup aversion, defined as a desire to not engage in activities associated
with the outgroup; demographic organization, including network autocorrelation; and
the scale of communication, contrasting local, short-range observations with long-
range observations of distant actors. We also examine how these three factors in-
fluence patterns of local and global polarization, or the extent to which adoption is
skewed towards one group or another, suggesting demographic segregation. In the
following sections, we present two models of innovation adoption as a social marker.
The first is an analytical model that takes as its starting point the well-known model
of Bass (1969). This was the first model to provide a generative explanation of why
many diffusion processes generate S-shaped adoption curves. We extend this model
to allow for two groups who are averse to products associated with the other group.
Such a model is necessarily limited, however, because it assumes perfect population
mixing and therefore cannot account for the influences of structural aspects of de-
mography or communication. Focusing on structural influences can provide important
insights, because micro-level mechanisms frequently aggregate into population-level
consequences in non-obvious ways (Davis, 2006). To investigate these influences,
therefore, we introduce a spatially-structured agent-based model.
Our agent-based model allows for quite a bit more complexity than is afforded by
the analytical model, and thus a direct comparison is not our intention. However, for-
malizing the verbal description in two distinct ways provides several benefits. First,
while both models illustrate that when products become social markers, outgroup
aversion can lead to population-wide underadoption as well as delayed or suppressed
adoption among members of one group, each model highlights a distinct causal mech-
anism. Second, the analytical model provides a formal link between prior work on
the diffusion of innovations, while the agent-based model that allows us to more fully
explore our questions of interest. Third, there are often many possible formal instan-
tiations of a complex social system. We show that two different formalizations yield
compatible results, thus providing the beginnings of a triangulation on a robust the-
ory of social identity and product adoption. Finally, we also connect our model with
the literature on opinion polarization, examining the factors that lead to different
kinds of polarization in product adoption.
2. Analytical Model
The canonical model of product diffusion was introduced by Bass (1969), and pro-
vided a concise explanation of the sigmoidal patterns of diffusion observed by Rogers
(1962) and others (Barnett, 2011; Bass, 2004). Bakshi et al. (2013) recently ex-
tended Bass’s model to account for product adoption by two interacting groups2. We
adopt their formalism here. For each group, the probability of adoption is influenced
by three factors: a background rate of spontaneous adoption, social influence from
2Bakshi et al. refer to these as “segments” of the population.
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one’s group members, and social influence from members of the outgroup. The model
takes the form of coupled differential equations
dN1
dt
= (a1 + b1N1 + c1N2)(m1 −N1) (1)
dN2
dt
= (a2 + b2N2 + c2N1)(m2 −N2), (2)
where for each group i, ai > 0, bi > 0, mi > 0, and 0 ≤ Ni ≤ mi. Ni is the current
number of adopters at time t, out of a potential market of size mi. The remaining
terms are the coefficient for innovation, ai, the coefficient for within-group imitation,
bi, and the coefficient for cross-group imitation, ci. If both c terms are zero, the
model reduces to two independent instantiations of the Bass (1969) model. Bakshi et
al. (2013) took their inspiration from Simmel’s (1904/1957) chase-and-flight theory,
and restricted their analyses to cases where cross-group influence was positive for one
group and negative for the other. Here, we are interested in the scenario where both
groups want to avoid being associated with the opposite group, and so will reject
or even disadopt products that are popular with the opposite group (Barth, 1969;
Berger & Heath, 2008; Wimmer, 2013). We therefore focus on the case where both
c1 and c2 are less than zero.
A closed-form solution for this system of equations is not analytically tractable
because of the coupled dependencies. Moreover, we are heavily interested in demo-
graphic and communication effects related to population structure, so we forego a
complete specification of the analytical model system3. However, some numerical
analysis is quite revealing. Our primary interests are in the dynamics of adoption
when products are social markers in the case of mutual repulsion, and not in the con-
sequences of major between-group differences in within and between-group imitation
or market size (though such consequences are surely worthy of future investigation).
As such, we focus on scenarios where the two groups are largely identical in their
propensity for within-group imitation, cross-group imitation, and market size, so that
b1 = b2 = b, c1 = c2 = c, m1 = m2 = m.
We anticipate that three categories of outcomes might emerge from the interaction
of outgroup aversion, social influence, and innovation rate. When outgroup aversion
is particularly strong it might overcome the force of ingroup imitation entirely and
result in underadoption in both groups. When ingroup imitation outweighs outgroup
aversion, we expect adoption to occur, and to be quicker in the group with a higher
rate of innovation. To explore these dynamics in more detail and their resultant equi-
libria, we vary the strengths of outgroup aversion, ingroup imitation, and innovation
rates, as described below. Delayed adoption can occur if outgroup aversion is weaker
than ingroup imitation, |c| < |b|, and the difference between the rates of innovation
in each group is small. If innovation rates are equal, a1 = a2, then adoption will
increase at the same rate in both groups, and since ingroup attraction outweighs
outgroup repulsion, both groups will always achieve full adoption at the same time.
If, however, the innovation rate is slightly higher in one group, then that group will
adopt at an initially faster rate. Even if this advantage in innovation rate in the first
3We provide, as a supplement, a Mathematica notebook for reproducing and altering the plots
shown in Figure 1 to enable a more thorough exploration of the analytical model by the curious
reader.
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Figure 1. Numerical simulation of the analytical model. For all sim-
ulations, a2 = .01, b = .006, m = 100. When ingroup attraction is
stronger than outgroup aversion and one group has a higher innovation
rate, the group with the lower innovation rate can have delayed (a)
or suppressed (b) adoption. For these simulations, c = −.002. When
outgroup aversion is stronger than ingroup attraction, an unstable equi-
librium of mutual partial adoption can give way to complete adoption
by one group and zero adoption by the other (c). For this simulation,
a1 = a2 = .01, c = −.007.
group is small, adoption among members of the second group can be substantially
delayed (Figure 1a). If this advantage is only slightly larger, however, adoption in the
second group can be completely suppressed. In our example, shown in Figure 1b, an
advantage of only 15% in i novation rate leads to enough of a disparity in adoption
rates between groups that outgroup aversion comes to completely suppress long-term
adoption in the group slower to innovate. Finally, consider if outgroup aversion is
stronger than ingroup attraction, |c| > |b|. Whatever group is slower to adopt ini-
tially will eventually be entirely suppressed. If both groups innovate at exactly the
same rate, a state of mutual underadoption can occur, in which neither group adopts
at saturation levels. However, such a state is unstable, and even the slightest pertur-
bation will lead to full adoption by one group and zero adoption by the other (Figure
1c).
This analysis indicates how the Bass (1969) model can be extended to include mu-
tually aversive social groups, and that outgroup aversion can lead to delayed adoption
or complete suppression of adoption by one group. Mutual underadoption is possible
but unstable. Thus, we may begin to investigate the appearance of these trends in
the dynamics of real world adoption.
Our aim is to advance the model from the stylized analytical model in a direction
that better matches reality. The analytical model assumes a well-mixed popula-
tion and random interactions among all individuals regardless of group membership.
These assumptions are useful as a first approximation but ultimately unsatisfying.
Members of different social groups do interact with one another, but individuals of-
ten preferentially interact with members of their own social groups (Lazarsfeld &
Merton, 1954; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). Moreover, communication
occurs both locally and occasionally over long distances, and rarely resembles the
well-mixed population implicit in the Bass model. For these reasons, we turn to an
agent-based model in order to investigate the effects of structure in demography and
communication.
8 SMALDINO, JANSSEN, HILLIS, & BEDNAR
Agent-based models involve explicit instantiation of individuals, and through com-
puter simulation can explore consequences of heterogeneous individuals interacting
in structured populations in ways difficult or impossible for purely mathematical ap-
proaches4 (Epstein, 2006; Peres et al., 2010; Rand & Rust, 2011; Smaldino,
Calanchini, & Pickett, 2015). We may then see if and when the outcomes generated
by the analytical model occur in the agent-based model, and perform more nuanced
analyses of the dynamics of diffusion.
3. Agent-Based Model
We designed our model not to represent any specific demographic system, but
rather as an abstraction representing general properties common to many systems in
which individuals maintain social networks on which many but not all interactions
take place. The population is structured into discrete patches upon which agents live
and interact. Patches can represent geographic localities, but need not; they simply
connote any highly clustered interaction network. Inter-patch interactions may also
occur, representing long-distance effects such as travel, telephone, and social media.
A product will be introduced which has some intrinsic appeal. As in the analytical
model, the probability of adoption increases with multiple exposures, reflecting so-
ciological research on complex contagion (Centola, 2010; Centola & Macy, 2007)
as well as marketing research on network externalities, which can increase the utility
of adoption as more people adopt (Peres et al., 2010). However, if an individual’s
experience with the product is such that its adoption is preferentially associated with
the outgroup, adoption becomes less likely. In our analysis we will explore the effect
of several parameters, including the importance of identity signaling, the extent of
homophily in demographic organization, and the influence of long-range interactions.
More formally, the population is distributed across M patches, which are situated
along a line so that each patch has two neighboring patches with the exception of
patches 1 and M (the first and last patches), which have only one neighbor. While
our line of patches is not as common a way of modeling spatial structure as others,
such as Moore neighborhoods, we settled on this arrangement because it facilitates
the examination of short and long range interactions among individuals with varying
identities in the most minimal way5. We visualized this layout by placing the patches
on a square grid, such that the rightmost patch in one row neighbors the leftmost
patch in the row just below it (Figure 2). Each patch contains N agents. Each
agent has one of S social identities (S = {A,B}). To avoid global majority/minority
effects, we assumed equal overall numbers of individuals holding each group identity,
though we allowed the distribution of identities to vary within each patch. Because
similar individuals tend to assort (Dow et al., 1982; McPherson et al., 2001), we
generally assumed that, firstly, each patch would tend to be dominated by individuals
4Even when mathematical approximations are possible, they are imprecise and can miss important
results only available to simulation approaches, as in de Aguiar, Rauch, and Bar-Yam (2004).
5The line is the simplest organizational framework with which to study structured interactions.
It also allowed for an easily implementable and interpretable spatial correlation between neighboring
patches, which would be more complicated in network structures in which patches could share more
than one neighbor in common, such as a square lattice or small world network. That said, our model
is easily extendable to those and other network structures.
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Figure 2. Schematic visualization of the model world. Alternating
light and dark squares are patches. Pink circles are members of group
A and blue squares are members of group B. Five early adopters in
the center patch (#25), four from group A and one from group B, are
indicated by the darker red and blue coloring and increased size. Here
M = N = 49, and Q = 0.9.
belonging to one group or the other, and secondly, that the demographic skew of
patches (i.e., the proportion of agents having a particular social identity) would tend
to be spatially correlated – that the identity distribution within each patch more
closely resembles the distribution in neighboring patches than in distant ones6. The
algorithm for assigning agents to patches is given below. At time t = 0, an innovation
is introduced into the population, which can be adopted. We assume that all agents
share identical intrinsic valuation for the product and are equally capable of adopting
it. In a single patch, n0 < N agents are chosen as “early adopters,” who are initialized
as already having adopted the innovation, and are randomly drawn from the same
patch without heed to social identity. Note that we use the word “patch” to denote
agents’ spatial location. All uses of the word “group” refer to agents’ social identity,
not their location.
Agents learn about the innovation through interactions with other agents. At each
time step, each agent makes an observation with probability µ, the interaction rate.
If an observation occurs, the focal agent observes a sample of m other agents. These
observed agents are sampled one at a time. With probability f , an observed agent is
6In assuming the spatial correlation between patches we have in mind the smooth transitions
that one experiences in moving from one media market to another and not the sharp distinctions
in identities that one experiences when crossing the tracks or suburban boundaries, as in a Tiebout
(1956) world.
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sampled at random from the focal agent’s own patch. Otherwise, the observed agent
is drawn at random from an external patch. The parameter f allows us to contin-
uously vary the clustering of the population, with a well-mixed population at one
extreme and an isolated islands model at the other. When observations involve an
external patch, that patch may be restricted to spatial neighbors of the focal agent’s
patch (local external observation), or be randomly drawn from the entire population
of patches (long-range external observation). Neighboring patches have correlated
demographic properties; that is, they have similar proportions of the two marked
groups. Long-range observations result in a more well-mixed population structure
in which individuals are influenced by others who might reside in environments that
are, at a local level, demographically quite different7 (Flache & Macy, 2011). Ob-
servations allow agents to become aware of innovations, and to make assessments of
the innovation’s prevalence among both in- and out-group individuals8. The order in
which agents make observations is randomized at each time step. Once an agent has
observed m other agents, she makes a decision about whether to adopt the innovation.
3.1. Social Influence and Innovation Adoption. Following an observation, the
agent decides whether or not to adopt the innovation. This decision is made even if
the agent has previously adopted the innovation; in this case, a decision not to adopt
implies a disadoption. Two factors contribute to the consideration of adoption: (1) a
generalized frequency-dependent bias, whereby the more popular a product is in the
population, the more likely an agent is to adopt it, and (2) an aversion bias, whereby
agents prefer not to adopt an innovation adopted by outgroup members. By including
a generalized frequency-dependent bias instead of restricting positive influence to
one’s ingroup, we are able to analyze the contrasting influences of positive frequency
dependence and outgroup aversion in a more realistic manner than was possible in
the analytical model.
First, consider the frequency dependent influence, F . An agent is more likely to
adopt a more common product. We follow Granovetter (1978) in assuming that the
likelihood of adoption is influenced by positive feedback – the more people do some-
thing, the more people will be willing to join in. This influence is probabilistic; for
example, Berger and Heath (2007) found that, regardless of whether a product was
identity relevant, some small proportion of people (at least 14% in their study 3)
still chose a minority product over a more popular one. Nevertheless, their findings
support the claim that, all things being equal, people tend to prefer more popular
items, fitting the literature on positive biases in social transmission of ideas and be-
haviors (Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer, & Welch, 1998). In many cases, social forces
can also lead to the preferential adoption of already popular items. For example, Sal-
ganik, Dodds, and Watts (2006) used an artificial online music market to show that
a product’s adoption was largely determined by its early popularity, independent of
inherent quality. Our assumption of positive frequency dependence is also congruent
7In reality, even long-range observations will likely be skewed by homophily. Our formalization
allows us to control the rate of homophilic interactions more precisely.
8Product information flow in our model involves only direct social communication, and for simplic-
ity excludes mass media influences. A modification in which agents received additional information
from third-party sources, perhaps represented by “media agents,” could be added for future analyses.
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with research on complex contagion, which indicates that the adoption of social be-
havior often requires multiple sources of influence (Centola & Macy, 2007), as well
as with research on network externalities, in which the utility of adoption increases
as more consumers adopt the product (Peres et al., 2010). For example, the util-
ity of purchasing a plug-in electric car increases as more people own them, because
charging stations will become more prevalent and mechanics will be encouraged to
gain expertise in their maintenance.
The positive frequency-dependent bias is tempered by the effects of outgroup aver-
sion, the inverse of which is denoted by V . An agent is more likely to adopt an
innovation that is more closely associated with individuals of the same social identity,
and less likely to adopt an innovation that is closely linked to agents of another social
identity. There is considerable evidence that people are more like to adopt a product
when it is preferentially associated with their ingroup (Morvinski et al., 2014), and
that people who initially adopt a behavior or product will abandon it if it becomes
associated with outgroup individuals (Berger & Heath, 2007, 2008). Bakshi et al.
(2013) observe that “Repulsion [from the outgroup] results in flight from potential
adopters, but does it also lead prior adopters to flee and disadopt? It very often
does, the one exception being situations with very high switching costs.” (p. 3). In
agreement with Bakshi et al. (2013), our model is most relevant to products with low
to moderate switching costs. We note, however, that even expensive items may have
low switching costs. For example, in the U.S. it is not uncommon to purchase a new
car every few years.
We assume that frequency dependence and outgroup aversion interact multiplica-
tively, so that the probability of adoption is given by
Pr(adopt) = FV. (3)
The frequency-dependent component is given by
F = xλ, (4)
where x is the proportion of observed agents who have adopted the innovation, and
λ ∈ (0, 1) is a control parameter representing the strength of the frequency depen-
dence. Many models of innovation diffusion formalize positive bias by a constant
parameter times the number of adopters encountered, as we did in our analytical
model. For our agent-based model, we wanted to be able to control the total number
of agents observed, corresponding to an overall rate of contact, without changing the
overall likelihood of adoption. Indeed, someone whose interactions are restricted to
a small group of friends, all of whom have adopted, should be more likely to adopt
than someone who has encountered many more people, only a fraction of whom have
adopted. The parameter λ allows us to maintain this relationship between observa-
tions and adoptions and still vary the strength of the frequency dependence. When
λ is closer to zero, the effect of direct social influence is small, so that innovations
are likely to be adopted even at fairly low frequencies. When λ is closer to one,
the probability of adoption scales linearly with the observed frequency of adopters9.
Note also that this formulation conveniently combines socially influenced adoption
9Mathematically, it is of course possible for λ to be greater than one, further decreasing the
probability of adoption when the product is rare. We restrict our analysis to the range (0, 1),
because diffusion tends to fail for values of λ near or greater than one.
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Figure 3. The probability of adoption is the product of F and V .
and spontaneous innovation, which are separated in the Bass model, into a single
term.
The influence of ingroup-outgroup bias is given by
V = 1− b+ b
1 + exp[−(mI −mO)] , (5)
where mI and mO are the number of observed agents who have adopted the innovation
and are either in the ingroup or the outgroup, respectively, and b ∈ [0, 1] is the
strength of outgroup aversion, such that the lower bound of V is 1− b. The functions
F and V are visualized in Figure 3.
3.2. Initialization. The population consists of M patches, each with N agents, for a
total ofMN agents. We assume that there are equal numbers of each group’s members
in the overall population. However, individual patches can vary in the proportions of
members of each social group. The demographic skew, Q, is the maximum proportion
of group A among the patches, so that the patch with the lowest frequency of group
A members has frequency 1 − Q. For each patch j, such that j ∈ {1, ...,M}, the
frequency of group A members qj is given by
qj =
(
1− j − 1
M − 1
)
Q+
(
j − 1
M − 1
)
(1−Q), (6)
which simplifies to
qj =
j − 1
M − 1 +
(
1− 2(j − 1)
M − 1
)
Q. (7)
Patch j therefore contains qjN members of group A and (1− qj)N members of group
B, both rounded to their nearest integer values. Note that when Q = 0.5, each
patch has an equal number of members from each group. Q = 1 is the maximum
skew, where each group has a single patch entirely devoid of outgroup individuals.
For our initial simulations, we used Q = 0.9, and M = N = 49 (see Figure 2). For
most simulations, five early adopters were seeded in the most centrally located and
heterogeneous patch (patch 25, the center patch), though we also experimented with
seeding early adopters in a more far-flung, more homogeneous patch (patch 1, the
leftmost patch). All parameters and values used for our simulations are summarized
in Table 1.
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Parameter Definition Default Value Sensitivity
n0 number of early adopters 5
µ interaction rate 0.05
m number of agents observed 30
f probability of within-patch observation 0.7 [0.1, 0.9]
λ frequency dependence 0.3 [0.1, 0.9]
b outgroup aversion 1 [0, 1]
Q demographic skew 0.9 {0.5, 0.9}
Start patch location of early adopters 25 {1, 25}
External observation location of observed extra-patch agents 0.7 {local, random}
Table 1. Model parameters and values. Sensitivity is the set or range
of values tested.
3.3. Metrics of Adoption and Polarization. Each model instantiation was run
for 2,000 time steps, which was always long enough to reach an equilibrium in which
adoption levels remained consistent. Inspection of sample simulations run for over
20,000 time steps indicates that such equilibria are dynamically stable. Aggregate
data are averages from 100 runs for each set of parameter values. Our results are
summarized using the total adoption level as well as local and global polarization
metrics:
• Adoption is the fraction of the total population that has adopted the innova-
tion. Patch-level adoption levels were also recorded for each of the two social
identity groups.
• Global polarization is a measure of the extent to which, at the level of the
population, adoption is skewed toward one social identity group over the other.
This is simply |n1 − n2|/(n1 + n2), where n1 and n2 are the number of agents
in each group, respectively, who have adopted the innovation. This will be
zero when each group has an equal number of adopters and one when all the
adopters belong to one group.
• Local polarization is the average patch-level polarization. This is equal to∑
j |n1j/N1j−n2j/N2j)|, where n1j and n2j are the number of group A or group
B adopters in patch j, and N1j and N2j are the total number of group A and
group B individuals. This formulation allows us to control for inequalities in
the number of agents from each group in each patch, so that a patch where
everyone has adopted will have zero polarization regardless of the number of
agents from each group. As a convenience, we let 0/0 = 0.
Our agent-based model was implemented in both Java, using the MASON library
(Luke, Cioffi-Revilla, Sullivan, & Balan, 2005), and NetLogo (Wilensky, 1999),
each coded independently by different authors (PS and MJ, respectively) to ensure
that results were not due to programming error. The results reported are performed
with the Java version and the model code is made freely available on openabm.org10.
Unless otherwise indicated, all results presented utilize the default parameter values
shown in Table 1.
10Model code will be made public when paper is accepted. For now, it is available at:
http://smaldino.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/AdoptionAsSocialMarker.zip
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4. Simulation Results
In our analytical model, we found that delayed adoption, suppressed adoption,
and mutual underadoption could all occur as a result of differential innovation rates
between groups, depending on the strength of outgroup aversion. An important
finding of our agent-based investigation is that all three of these outcomes occurred,
but with somewhat different characteristics and through different causal mechanisms.
In the analytical model, differences in innovation rate corresponded to persistent
differences in the spontaneous adoption of the product by members of each group. The
empirical meaning of this parameter is unclear, however, unless one can definitively
state that members of one group are more or less innovative (though differences in
access to the product or inherent wealth could provide a means for such an outcome).
In our agent-based model, all adoption apart from a few early adopters is due to direct
social influence. Thus, the agent based model demonstrates that differences in group-
level adoption outcomes can arise even when there are no differences in innovation
rate. Rather, these differences emerge from structural differences in how individuals
interact with one another.
In our agent-based model, the structure of communication is determined by two
parameters: the tendency for observations to occur within one’s patch, f , and whether
extra-patch observations are made locally (in a neighboring patch) or randomly across
the entire population, with the latter case representing long-range communication or
high levels of social mixing.
When observations were mostly local, we observed local but not global polarization,
with persistent underadoption at the population level. Here, outgroup aversion sup-
pressed adoption by the minority within patches (Figures 4a and 5a). Results here
were similar regardless of whether extra-patch observations were local or random,
because most observations occurred within an agent’s own patch.
When external observations were more common but restricted to neighboring patches
(which are demographically similar in terms of group membership), we observed de-
layed adoption resulting from small stochastic differences in initial conditions, which
cascade as a result of network structure. Here, adoption flowed from patch to patch
in the direction of increasing prevalence of the group that first began to adopt at
a higher rate. In the other direction, members of the same group as those early
adopters were increasingly rare, allowing outgroup aversion to delay adoption until
sufficient individuals from the second group adopted. Once this occurred, adoption
flowed from patch to patch in that direction among the second group (Figures 4b and
5b). In such cases, the population may initially become quite polarized (as when one
group is the primary adopter), but quickly equilibrates so that both groups adopted
in nearly equal numbers overall. Note here that there is still underadoption at the
population level, because the product spreads only among one group (typically the
more numerous one) in each patch.
When external observations were common and randomly drawn from the entire
population, we observed total suppression of adoption in one group. This result
emerged from small differences in initial patterns of adoption and the subsequent path
dependency of stochastic interactions. When one group, purely by chance, exhibited a
slightly higher frequency of adoption early on, this initial disparity generated positive
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t = 0 t = 200t = 10 t = 30 t = 80 t = 120
f = 0.3, random observations(c)
f = 0.7, random observations(a)
f = 0.3, local observations(b)
Figure 4. The dynamics of local and global polarization. Visualiza-
tion of example model runs showing the spread of the innovation for
different rates of and strategies for external observation. White and
grey square patches each contain 49 agents. Small cyan and pink agents
have not adopted. They turn dark blue and red, respectively, when they
adopt. While all three runs illustrate underadoption, we also observed
delayed (b) and suppressed (c) adoption.
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Figure 5. Dynamics of adoption and polarization, from the runs de-
picted in Figure 4.
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Figure 6. Effect of outgroup aversion, b, and frequency dependence, λ.
feedback, making it more likely that members of the same group would adopt and
that outgroup individuals would not (Figures 4c and 5c).
The presence of multiple identity groups and widespread aversion toward adopt-
ing products or behaviors associated with an outgroup yield these distinct diffusion
dynamics. These are the major results generated by our model. For completeness,
we also present a more detailed analysis of the model behavior, and explore how the
dynamics respond to variations in parameter values.
4.1. Outgroup Aversion Hinders Adoption. First, we consider whether out-
group aversion hinders overall levels of adoption. For example, will the total pur-
chases of high-end electric cars be suppressed if a large share of the population would
prefer not to be associated with the West-coast elites who were among the first to
drive Teslas? Moreover, if a product is less intrinsically desirable (and thus its adop-
tion more dependent on social influence), how will this influence patterns of adoption
in our model? We expected adoption would decrease with an increase in either out-
group aversion, b, or frequency dependence, λ. These broad predictions follow from
our model assumptions. However, the extent to which these expectations will be
influenced by demographic skew and the location of early adopters was unclear.
We found that increasing the strength of outgroup aversion, b, hindered overall
adoption levels (Figure 6a). Stochastic events early in the adoption process led one
group to become associated with the innovation within any given patch, resulting
in the outgroup becoming averse to adoption. Within a patch, the adopting group
was highly likely to be the local majority, both because they were more likely to be
the early adopters (all things being equal) and because majority group members were
more likely to be observed by potential adopters. Stronger frequency dependence also
resulted in lower rates of adoption as long as outgroup aversion was nonzero. In these
cases, individuals were less likely to spontaneously adopt, creating a feedback loop
resulting in persistent low adoption. Indeed, because outgroup aversion reduced the
availability of ready adopters and impeded the spread of the innovation when rare,
high values of λ under strong outgroup aversion sometimes meant the innovation failed
entirely to spread (i.e., the adoption rate was zero at the end of the simulation),
though this was also influenced by the initial location of early adopters as well as
the degree of demographic skew (Figure 7). The effects of high λ were mitigated
by higher demographic skew, especially when the innovation was seeded in a highly
skewed patch, where effects of outgroup aversion were minimized.
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Figure 7. The fraction of runs (of 100) in which the adoption failed
to spread, as a function of λ. The patch skew and starting patch were
varied as indicated.
4.2. Outgroup Aversion Increases Local, But Not Global, Polarization. Sec-
ond, we consider the how outgroup aversion interacts with the spatial structure. In
particular, we considered whether outgroup aversion affects local and global polar-
ization similarly. These are distinct variables; although a population may have high
polarization at both local and global levels (if one group always adopts at a higher
rate), it can also have high local but low global polarization (if adoption always favors
the local majority). Our analytical model produced global polarization under some
conditions, but lacked spatial structure and so could not examine local polarization.
We found that stronger outgroup aversion did not much influence the level of global
polarization (Figure 6b). Some global polarization did occasionally occur when fre-
quency dependence was high, though this was due to low overall adoption rates and
stochasticity in early adoption. We do note that the lack of global polarization is likely
dependent on our strong assumption of equally represented social identity groups and
symmetrical demographic skew. Future work should explore the effects of asymmet-
rically distributed social groups. That said, increased outgroup aversion reliably led
to increased local polarization (Figure 6c). Within patches, one group tended either
to have an initially higher rate of adoption (a first mover effect) or to be dominant in
sheer numbers, so that the minority group of adopters came to be biased against the
product. The members of the local majority group were often, but not always, the
primary adopters within a patch.
4.3. Higher Demographic Skew Increases Adoption When Interactions Are
Local. Third, we investigated how the spatial distribution of identity groups interacts
with the patterns of communication between patches to influence patterns of adoption.
Our analytical model assumed a well-mixed population, and so could not reveal any
insights into this question. Analysis of our agent-based model indicates that these
factors matter.
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Figure 8. The global rate of adoption as a function of λ. Increased
demographic skew increases rates of adoption. Adoption is unaffected
by the start patch.
The demographic skew, Q, determines the degree to which some patches will be
preferentially populated by one group over the other. Q = 0.5 indicates that each
patch draws 50% of its members from each group. The start patch (SP) is where the
innovation is first adopted. As noted, under moderately high frequency dependence,
innovations spread more readily under high demographic skew and when the location
of early adopters is centrally located in the network (Figure 7). We also found that,
regardless of the strength of frequency dependence, greater demographic skew gener-
ated higher overall rates of adoption (Figure 8). In the long run, adopters in any given
patch tended to be members of a single identity group, which created a stable scenario
in which non-adopters were prevented from ever adopting due to outgroup aversion.
This influenced overall levels of adoption, and the degree of global underadoption.
In a scenario in which all patches have 50% of their members from each group, the
total population-level of adoption will be at most 50%. In contrast, a world in which
patches are skewed can yield greater overall adoption, because within any patch a
majority of individuals can be adopters. We note that once the innovation spread,
the long-term outcome was not affected by the location of early adopters. In other
words, the location of early adopters influenced the proportion of failed runs (runs in
which the innovation failed to spread) but did not have an impact on the long-term
rate of overall adoption.
4.4. The Absence of Demographic Skew Increases Global Polarization.
Fourth, we found that the level of demographic skew, Q, influenced the amount of
polarization in the population, and also affected how polarization was influenced by
the rate of within-patch observation, f . As noted above, when patches were skewed
and agents were averse to the outgroup, the population could sustain higher rates
of adoption than when patches all had equal numbers of each group. When patches
were skewed, the maximum adoption levels occurred as long as the rate of long-range
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Figure 9. Aggregate statistics for runs different rates of and strategies
for external observation under different levels of patch skew, Q.
interactions were kept relatively low, either by having a large f for random observa-
tions or by restricting observations locally. However, when patches all contained an
equal number of agents from either group, the overall rate of adoption was unaffected
by either the rate of external observations or whether external patches are located
locally or randomly (Figure 9a). The adoption rate was unaffected because within
each patch, one group dominated the adoption as long as some nonzero proportion
of observations were made internally. The patches were therefore equally polarized
(Figure 9c) regardless of which group has the innovation.
Figure 9b shows the conditions under which the population could achieve global
polarization (that is, when the innovation was adopted only by one group). When
patches were highly skewed, there was a transition from complete polarization to
(near) zero polarization as long-range interactions become rarer. When all patches
had equal numbers of each group, there was almost always some degree of polar-
ization, even when one group did not completely dominate. Polarization continued
because within each patch, the group that achieves an early majority in adoption lev-
els is determined entirely by stochastic events. Figure 10 shows the dynamics of a run
in which observations were local and there was no demographic skew (Q = 0.5). Al-
though the population structure did not favor either group to be the primary adopter
globally, the nature of observations nevertheless facilitated significant global polar-
ization.
5. Discussion
We have constructed a model that takes population structure into account to
deepen our understanding of how identity signaling, and particularly outgroup aver-
sion, affects the dynamics of product adoption. We find that the emergence of prod-
ucts as identity signals, coupled with an aversion to be mistaken for a member of an
outgroup, can dramatically influence the dynamics of how products or other cultural
variants diffuse in a population structure. The network structure of the population
and the way information is transmitted within and between social network clusters
also influences the long-term dynamics of diffusion, resulting in population-wide un-
deradoption. Under some conditions, we observe that one group may experience
delayed adoption or have adoption entirely suppressed. We find that an aversion to
adopt products associated with an outgroup can decrease overall rates of adoption,
leading to local polarization within network clusters or other communities. When
communication is restricted to local networks, or otherwise remains between demo-
graphically similar communities, polarization can remain local. When communication
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Figure 10. (a, b) Dynamics for an example run in which Q = 0.5,
f = 0.3, and external observations are local. (c) Screen shot of the
population at time t = 500.
is long-range, such that interactions occur between individuals from demographically
dissimilar communities, polarization can become global. Perhaps most interestingly,
we find that structural constraints on information flow can generate phenomena oth-
erwise attributable to intrinsic between-group differences.
Social identities are among the driving factors in organizing social behaviors in
complex societies. Individuals organize into marked groups, within which norms and
values are reinforced, setting differential criteria for wide ranges of social behavior, in-
cluding consumer behavior. Interactions between relative strangers are commonplace
in the modern industrialized world, necessitating mechanisms for partner selection
and coordinated joint activities. Social identity is likely an important component of
those coordination efforts (Smaldino, 2017). Arbitrary markers, including fashion,
modes of speech, or product adoption, can serve as useful signals for determining
identity if they are reliable signals thereof. Importantly, such markers need not have
any initial intrinsic association with an identity. Instead, when the need for coordi-
nation is present, associations between markers and meaningful identities can emerge
organically (DellaPosta et al., 2015; Efferson, Lalive, & Fehr, 2008; McElreath et
al., 2003). This association can feed back into subsequent social behavior. If the
adoption of markers, including consumer products, is seen as a signal of group iden-
tity, individuals might not adopt products that they associate with outgroups (Berger
& Heath, 2007, 2008). Our model indicates that, at the population level, this can
lead to widespread polarization in the adoption of products, including delayed or
suppressed adoption by one group that would otherwise find adoption appealing, as
well as underadoption at the population level.
Our results further indicate that the increases in long-range communication facili-
tated by technologies such as text messaging and social networking sites should lead
certain products and technologies to become globally associated with certain groups
or affiliations. This polarization should interact with and be reinforced by psycholog-
ical forces which lead individuals to grow increasingly similar to interaction partners
whose views they already share, and increasingly different from those whose views
they do not share (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Miller, McHoskey, Bane, & Dowd,
1993). Previous analysis of opinion dynamics in a network indicate that increased
long-range interactions can foster increased polarization in network clusters, in part
because individuals are more likely to be exposed to extreme versions of their original
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views (Flache & Macy, 2011). Such polarization might create new ingroup-outgroup
distinctions, leading to further reductions in the adoption of innovations.
If more widespread adoption and the associated reduction of polarization are desir-
able goals, the role of social identity cannot be ignored. A pressing example is in the
adoption of sustainable or environmentally “friendly” technologies. Firms, advertis-
ers, and policy makers should make efforts to reduce the extent to which products are
seen as social markers. One possibility is increased attention to research advanced by
social psychologists on how to reduce ingroup bias and turn opponents into collabora-
tors (e.g. Sherif, 1988). Another option might be the introduction of competing but
equivalent products to occupy the various niches created by different identity groups.
Although the present analysis suggests that social identity salience should be avoided
for maximal diffusion, this runs counter to the way many companies explicitly and
successfully market their products, because in reality brands often compete for differ-
ent submarkets. On the other hand, activists looking to decrease the market share of
an environmentally costly product might seek to associate it with one clearly marked
group to avoid adoption by another group.
The factors influencing innovation diffusion among competing brands are many,
and analysis thereof in the context of identity signaling is beyond the scope of this
paper, but it is perhaps helpful to speculate as to potential complications to diffusion
dynamics arising from social identity. Consider competition between brands with
cross-brand influence. Libai et al. (2009) modeled such a system and noted a rapid
takeoff of the follower brand, which was countered by a persistent “interaction-based”
advantage to the first entrant, in which its initial numeric advantage continuously fed
back to generate more new adopters. They showed these effects could be observed in
cellular service markets in Western Europe in the span between 1985-2005. Identity
was not necessary to explain their results, a fact we find unsurprising. We should
not expect social identity to be a significant factor in this setting, because cell service
is not a visible product like a car, a smartphone, or an article of clothing. For
products that can serve as a social marker, we expect the dynamics of adoption to
be different. Exactly how group identity and social markers influence cross-brand
adoption effects is not clear, but one assumption of cross-brand influence is that the
prevalence of one brand increases the likelihood of adoption for the other brand.
This effect could potentially be amplified in the case of identity signaling, because
there would simultaneously be a reminder of the niche being filled by the product,
and an incentive to avoid identification with the outgroup. In this case, the timing
of a counter-identifying brand is expected to be even more critical than previously
thought. On the other hand, the timing of brand introduction may matter less if the
effect of identity signaling is very strong. We performed some simple analyses with
an extension of our model, not presented here, in which two competing brands were
introduced simultaneously. We found that, under some conditions, each brand could
become fully associated with a different identity group, following an initial period
of adoption and dis-adoption as the brands emerged as markers for each group. A
related possibility is that competing brands may be viewed as categorically similar,
leading to cross-brand inhibition. A considered analysis of social identity in diffusion
dynamics with competing brands is warranted in future research.
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Our model presents a picture of innovation adoption that is necessarily limited.
One factor neither of our models explored is differences in population size among the
two groups. We might expect that outgroup aversion, in the context of groups of
different size, could actually increase the amount of adoption overall, if the larger
group is the adopting group, while suppressing adoption among the minority group.
Many factors other than social identity influence decisions to adopt a product, behav-
ior, or other cultural variant, including the innovation’s intrinsic quality, the status
or social power of current and potential adopters (sensu Bonacich, 1987), and the
current needs and available resources of the individual. Multiple products can exist
to fit similar niches, each of which may appeal to different identity demographics.
Multiple groups exist, not just two. Social identities are complex, hierarchical, and
context dependent; certain group identities can become more or less salient depending
on personal, social, and environmental circumstances (Ashmore et al., 2004; Roccas
& Brewer, 2002; Smaldino, 2017). Moreover, identifying the network structure of
communication-related product information can be tricky. Individuals are influenced
by direct observation, word of mouth, advertising, and other media. Network position
matters. For example, individuals with more network ties are often early adopters,
while those with fewer network ties are often later adopters (Valente, 1996). The
availability of products and institutional support for their adoption may work in tan-
dem with social identity to foster or impede support for a product. For example,
identification as a political liberal or environmentalist might lead a person to become
interested in adopting hybrid or electric vehicle technologies, but the feasibility of
that adoption is highly dependent on the presence of local dealerships and the infras-
tructure of charging stations, which in turn may depend on government incentives
(Diamond, 2009; San Roma´n, Momber, Abbad, & Miralles, 2011; Wirasingha,
Schofield, & Emadi, 2008). Nevertheless, the simplifications in our model allow an
uncluttered examination of the role of social identity and emergent social markers in
the dynamics of innovation adoption.
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